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Abstract 
Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state?  Prior 
explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law, as well as 
the positive network externalities created by so many other firms domiciling in Delaware.  
We offer an additional explanation: a firm may choose Delaware simply because its law is 
nationally known and thus can serve as a “lingua franca” for in-state and out-of-state 
investors.  Analyzing the incorporation decisions of 1,850 VC-backed startups, we find 
evidence consistent with this lingua-franca explanation.  Indeed, the lingua-franca effect 
appears to be more important than other factors that have been shown to influence 
corporate domicile, such as corporate-law flexibility and the quality of a state’s judiciary.  
Our study contributes to the literature on the market for corporate charters by providing 
evidence that Delaware’s continued dominance is in part due to investors’ familiarity with 
its corporate law.    
 
JEL Classifications: K22, G24, G34 
Keywords: incorporation, domicile, Delaware, corporate governance, entrepreneurs, 
founders, startups, corporation, corporate law, charters, venture capital  
 
 
                                                          
 For helpful comments on this project, we are grateful to Michael Alexeev, Lucian Bebchuk, Ola Bengtsson, 
Steven Davidoff, Victor Fleischer, Marcel Kahan, Michael Klausner, Eric Rasmusen, Larry Ribstein, Xuan Tian, 
two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Indiana University, Notre Dame, the University of 
Wisconsin, the University of Southern California, the Transactional Law Vidyo Workshop, the 2011 Midwest 
Law and Economics Association conference, the 2011 Law and Society Association annual meeting, and the 
2013 American Law and Economics Association annual meeting. We would also like to thank Edward 
Dumoulin, Ryan Finn, Josh Lipton, Rodan Luo, Jordan Mikes, Noah Priluck, and Chad Ranney for valuable 
research assistance, and the VC attorneys who shared their experiences with us.  This paper is dedicated to 
the memory of Professor Ola Bengtsson (1975 – 2014), who shared our interest in entrepreneurial finance 
and whose friendship and collegiality we will sorely miss. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117967 
 
 
3 
1. Introduction 
Delaware dominates the corporate chartering market in the U.S—it is the only state 
that attracts a significant number of out-of-state incorporations.1 As a result, incorporation 
decisions are “bimodal:” public and private firms typically choose between home-state and 
Delaware incorporation, with most public firms and large private firms going to Delaware 
(Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2002; Daines, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Dammann and 
Schündeln, 2011).  
Why would a firm today incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? 
Traditional accounts focus on the inherent quality of Delaware’s corporate-law rules. 
Under the “race-to-the-top” view, firms choose Delaware because its law maximizes firm 
value for shareholders (Winter, 1977; Romano 1985).  Under the “race-to-the-bottom” 
view, firms choose Delaware because it offers corporate law that favors insiders at other 
parties’ expense (Cary, 1974; Bebchuk, 1992; Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk, 2006).  
More recent explanations for why a firm might choose Delaware turn not on the 
inherent quality of its law but rather on the number of other firms incorporated in 
Delaware.  Drawing on the network-effects literature, Klausner (1995) argues that a firm 
(Firm X) committing to a long-term domicile (such as an IPO firm that cannot easily change 
domicile after going public) may choose Delaware even if its corporate law is not optimal 
because a large number of other firms will be domiciled in Delaware in the future.  This 
large, continuing network of Delaware firms ensures that Firm X will have access to more 
caselaw and better legal services in the future than if Firm X domiciles in its home state, 
where the firm network is smaller. 
                                                          
1 A firm located in a particular state is generally permitted to incorporate in any other state, and to thereby 
have its internal affairs governed by that other state’s corporate law (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991).   
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Relatedly, Kahan and Klausner (1997) argue that contractual terms (in loan 
agreements, charters, etc.) may persist not because of their quality but simply because of 
the “learning benefits” (such as drafting efficiencies and a reduction in uncertainty) that 
arise from these terms having already been widely used.  Their analysis suggests that a firm 
may choose Delaware simply because of the learning benefits generated by so many other 
firms having chosen Delaware domicile in the past.  
We put forward and test a new explanation for why a firm today would go to 
Delaware rather than stay home: that Delaware law can serve as a lingua franca for 
investors around the country, both in-state and out-of-state.  The lingua-franca explanation 
builds on the fact that, after decades of Delaware’s dominance, business parties throughout 
the U.S.—including investors and their lawyers—are generally familiar only with Delaware 
law and the law of their home state (Daines, 2002; Klausner, 1995; Kahan and Klausner, 
1997). As Daines (2002, pg. 1581) puts it: 
Focusing on one national standard allows [corporate lawyers] to economize on the need to keep 
up to date with developments in multiple jurisdictions.  Delaware is thus much like a common 
language and such lawyers are “bi-lingual,” speaking Delaware law plus the local dialect.   
Thus, a firm wishing to attract investors from around the country may choose Delaware 
merely to provide a law that can be “spoken” by all of its investors. 
Although it is potentially related to the network and learning explanations for 
Delaware’s dominance, the lingua-franca effect is conceptually distinct and yields different 
predictions.  Network effects and learning benefits predict that a particular firm choosing 
between two jurisdictions will incorporate in the jurisdiction that will serve (network 
effects) or has served (learning benefits) as the legal domicile for more firms.  It depends 
on other firms’ decisions, not on the identity of the firm’s investors.  The lingua-franca 
effect, on the other hand, predicts that this firm’s choice between the two jurisdictions will 
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be directly affected by its own investors’ relative familiarity with these jurisdictions.  In 
other words, unlike network effects or learning benefits, the lingua-franca effect is 
generated by the background of the particular investors at the bargaining table. 
Of course, all of these explanations for Delaware’s dominance in the chartering 
market, including network effects and learning benefits, may help explain why Delaware 
law (and not the corporate law of some other state) became a lingua franca in the first 
place.  Corporate lawyers may choose to learn Delaware as a second (or first) language in 
part because of network effects or learning benefits that give Delaware an advantage over 
other states’ corporate laws; in part because of the inherent features of Delaware corporate 
law; in part because so many firms are or will be incorporated in Delaware (for whatever 
reason); and in part because it will be easier to work with other Delaware-speaking 
lawyers to incorporate new firms.2  We abstract here from the question of why Delaware 
law became a lingua franca.  Our claim is that, given that most lawyers around the country 
are familiar with Delaware law, some firms will domicile in Delaware simply to provide all 
of their investors with a language that every investor can understand.3   
We test for a lingua-franca effect using a sample of 1,850 startup firms financed by 
venture capitalists (VCs) that received their first round of VC financing between 2000 and 
2002.  VCs and their attorneys will wish to be familiar with the corporate law applicable to 
                                                          
2 Church and King (1993) develop a network-effects model in which the benefit of language acquisition is 
increasing in the number of individuals who speak the language. To the extent that lawyers learn to speak 
Delaware simply because many other lawyers have learned or will learn to speak Delaware, the lingua-franca 
effect we identify could itself be considered to reflect the operation of network effects. 
3 Just as network effects and learning benefits associated with Delaware law may strengthen its role as a 
lingua franca, a lingua-franca effect may strengthen the network effects and learning benefits associated with 
Delaware incorporation by increasing the number of firms domiciled in Delaware. In other words, causality 
between the lingua-franca effect and network/learning-benefits effects can run in both directions. 
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the startup: they rely on a complex set of contracts whose drafting and implementation are 
dependent on subtle features of the governing law (Fried and Ganor, 2006). By offering a 
more familiar corporate law (everything else equal), a startup’s entrepreneur can lower the 
cost of capital (Bengtsson and Bernhardt, 2012).  Because lawyers typically do not “speak” 
any other language besides Delaware and home-state law (Daines, 2002), out-of-state 
investors and their lawyers are likely to be less familiar with the startup’s home-state 
corporate law than with Delaware law.4  The lingua-franca explanation thus predicts that a 
startup is more likely to incorporate or reincorporate in Delaware as the number of out-of-
state VCs increases.  
VC-backed startups provide a particularly desirable empirical setting for testing the 
lingua-franca theory. First, there is considerable variation in each startup’s mix of 
investors.  Some startups receive financing from out-of-state investors, while others are 
financed exclusively by in-state investors. In contrast, public firms lack such cross-sectional 
variation because there is no control group of public firms whose investors are all (or even 
predominantly) located in a single state.  Second, startups provide longitudinal variation in 
both their mix of investors and their state of incorporation.  In particular, startups typically 
receive financing over several rounds, and the identity of participating investors often 
                                                          
4  The VC’s attorney will handle legal issues arising from a portfolio investment and therefore may have a 
stronger preference over domicile than the VC itself. Thus, it might be argued that the location of the VC’s 
attorney is what matters, not the location of the VC itself.  But VCs are typically advised either by in-house 
counsel (Kobylarz, 2006) or by law firms located in their home state.  We also asked 10 prominent VC firms in 
our sample about the location of their legal counsel; each of the 7 VC firms that responded to our query 
reported that its counsel was located in the VC firm’s home state.  Thus, to the extent it is VC’s counsel’s 
location that matters for lingua franca, we believe it is reasonable to treat the location of the VC firm as a 
proxy for the location of the VC’s counsel. 
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changes from one round to the next (Gompers, 1995; Broughman and Fried, 2012) along 
with the firm’s domicile.5 
 We find, consistent with the lingua-franca hypothesis, that the number of out-of-
state investors significantly increases the likelihood of Delaware incorporation in the first 
round of financing.  Everything else  equal, moving from zero to two out-of-state investors 
in the first round of financing increases the likelihood of Delaware incorporation by 14 
percentage points (from 68% to 82%).  We also find, consistent with the lingua-franca 
hypothesis, that each additional out-of-state investor increases the likelihood that a firm 
will reincorporate in Delaware in a follow-on round of financing by approximately four to 
six percentage points.  
 The lingua-franca hypothesis also predicts that in-state investors – which are likely 
to be familiar with both Delaware and their home-state corporate law – will have a 
relatively weak preference, if any, for home-state law.  Consistent with this prediction, the 
number of in-state investors participating in each round of financing has little effect on 
choice of domicile.  In-state investors appear to be relatively indifferent between Delaware 
and the home-state law, while out-of-state investors tend to prefer Delaware. 
We also divide out-of-state investors into (1) out-of-state investors who have some 
familiarity with home-state corporate law because they have previously invested in a 
home-state domiciled firm and (2) out-of-state investors who do not have such exposure to 
home-state corporate law. Consistent with the lingua-franca effect, we find that a startup is 
less likely to incorporate in Delaware if its out-of-state VC investors have already invested 
                                                          
5 It might be worth noting that because VC-backed firms can easily (and frequently do) change domicile, the 
network effect described in Klausner (1995), which arises when firms must make a long-term commitment to 
a particular domicile, is less likely to be present in the startup setting.   
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in firms incorporated in the startup’s home state, and thus have greater familiarity with 
home-state corporate law.  In other words, demand for Delaware law is greatest when a 
firm receives financing from out-of-state VCs that appear to have no prior exposure to the 
startup’s home-state corporate law.      
Our results are statistically significant and robust to alternative econometric 
specifications.  We control for a variety of factors that may affect choice of domicile such as 
startup firm characteristics, the law firm representing the startup firm, VC reputation, and 
characteristics of home-state corporate law.  In separate specifications, we also include 
state dummy variables in place of the corporate-law variables. 
Of course, omitted variables could correlate with both domicile and the number of 
out-of-state investors.  For example, a more complex firm may simultaneously both (a) face 
a higher likelihood of litigation, which could in theory increase the value of Delaware 
corporate law;  and (b) require financing from out-of-state investors.  If so, unobserved 
characteristics of the startup firm would independently increase both its need for out-of-
state financing and its likelihood of choosing Delaware.   
To address endogeneity concerns, we employ two identification strategies.  First, 
taking advantage of the longitudinal variation in our data, we use first-differences 
regression analysis to investigate whether the arrival of out-of-state investors causes firms 
originally incorporated in their home states to reincorporate in Delaware in subsequent 
rounds of financing.  This first-differences approach eliminates potential bias due to time-
constant unobserved traits of each startup.  Under this identification strategy, we obtain 
statistically significant results consistent with a lingua-franca effect. 
Second, we create a VC-fixed effect model that examines variation within each VC’s 
portfolio.  We compare the use of Delaware domicile when a VC invests at home to when 
the same VC invests out-of-state. This approach enables us to eliminate potential bias due 
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to unobserved variation across different VC firms.  We find, consistent with a lingua-franca 
effect, that the same VC is likely to use Delaware domicile more frequently when investing 
out-of-state than when investing in-state.  
 To illustrate by way of a specific VC firm, California-based Kleiner Perkins is 
approximately 18 percentage points more likely to use Delaware incorporation when it 
invests in a startup located outside California than one located in California (100% versus 
81.6%); and when Kleiner Perkins invests in a California-based startup that is financed 
solely by California-based VC firms, the likelihood of Delaware incorporation drops to 
64.3%.  While Kleiner Perkins exhibits a relatively strong lingua-franca effect, its domicile 
preferences reflect those of VC firms in aggregate: they are more likely to insist on 
Delaware law out-of-state than in-state. 
Not surprisingly, we find that other factors besides lingua-franca also affect domicile 
choice. Consistent with Kahan’s (2006) study of public firms, we find that states with a 
high-quality judiciary and more flexible corporate law are somewhat more likely to retain 
in-state corporations.  And consistent with Daines’s (2002) study of IPO firms, we find that 
startups represented by regional rather than national law firms are more likely to 
incorporate in their home states.  Our results suggest, however, that lingua franca is likely 
to be a more important determinant than these other factors.  
It is important to emphasize that our results may significantly understate the extent 
to which the lingua-franca effect (rather than other factors) drives the use of Delaware 
domicile.  Because Delaware has become such a dominant player in the market for 
incorporations, in any given state there may well be investors (and lawyers) who are more 
familiar with Delaware law than with that state’s own law (Carney, Shepherd and 
Shepherd, 2012).  A firm financed entirely by such in-state investors might thus choose 
Delaware simply for familiarity reasons.  Put differently, Delaware law may also serve as a 
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lingua franca for in-state investors, some of whom may not be fluent in home-state law.  
Our methodology enables us to detect only the lingua-franca effect arising from the 
presence of out-of-state investors.  
This project contributes to the empirical literature on corporate charters in three 
respects.  First, we identify a new dimension to domicile decisions. Researchers have 
previously identified three types of factors bearing on domicile choice: (1) inherent 
features of home-state corporate law, including anti-takeover statutes (Subramanian, 2002; 
Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Ferris et. al. 2006), flexibility and judicial quality (Kahan, 2006; 
Dammann and Schündeln 2011), whether the home state had adopted the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003), and franchise taxes (Romano, 1985); 
(2) whether the corporation’s law firm is regional or national (Daines, 2002); and (3) 
characteristics of the firm itself , including the size of the firm (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; 
Dammann and Schündeln, 2011) . Our study suggests a fourth dimension to domicile 
decisions: the characteristics of investors, and in particular the familiarity of investors with 
different corporate laws.  
Second, our study provides additional evidence that Delaware’s continued success is 
not due solely to the inherent quality of its corporate law, but rather is in part due to 
investors’ relative familiarity with it.  Klausner (1995) argues that network effects arising 
from the presence of so many firms incorporated in Delaware may prevent a state from 
competing with Delaware even if that state offers better law.  The learning benefits 
associated with the repeated use of Delaware provisions (Kahan and Klausner, 1997) could 
have similar anti-competitive effects.  Our study suggests yet another reason why another 
state may have difficulty competing with Delaware.  For that state to be successful, enough 
lawyers would need to learn a second or third “language.” But the expected benefit of 
learning a second or third language will be low given that Delaware fluency already allows 
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a corporate attorney in any state to communicate with most corporate attorneys in that 
same state and in other states. As a result, lawyers will be reluctant to learn a new 
language, and any state seeking to challenge Delaware is likely to fail to acquire market 
share.  This lingua-franca effect further raises the barrier to competition, and may hinder 
desirable state-level legal innovation (Carney, Shepherd and Shepherd, 2012).   
Third, this project contributes to the literature on how VCs influence the governance 
of startup companies.  Prior work has shown that VCs negotiate for a complex bundle of 
cash-flow and control rights (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003) that typically includes board 
seats (Lerner, 1995; Broughman, 2013); protective provisions (Bengtsson, 2011); and 
conversion rights (Schmidt, 2003; Hellmann, 2006).  VCs’ ability to realize their cash-flow 
rights depends in part on where the firm is domiciled (Broughman and Fried, 2010).  Our 
study extends this literature by showing that VC investors influence the choice of corporate 
law that will govern the startup.  
For methodological reasons, our study focuses on private firms. But it is worth 
mentioning its implications for the domicile choices of public firms.  If private firms choose 
Delaware law to provide a lingua franca for all of their investors, it stands to reason that 
firms wishing to sell their shares to public investors around the country through an IPO 
may also choose Delaware law in part to provide a common language to their shareholders.  
Indeed, we find that 93% of the firms in our sample that ultimately went public were 
incorporated in Delaware at the time of their IPO, a level that is significantly higher than 
the 78% baseline rate of Delaware incorporation for our sample as a whole.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes our data set 
and provides summary statistics on 1,850 firms’ states of incorporation and 
reincorporation.  Section 3 provides baseline empirical results, testing our hypothesis with 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal data.  Section 4 uses VC fixed-effect regressions to 
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address potential endogeneity concerns in the baseline results.  Section 5 considers 
alternative explanations for the correlation between out-of-state investors and Delaware 
incorporation.  Section 6 concludes. 
   
2. Data 
To test the lingua-franca prediction – that the likelihood of incorporation or 
reincorporation into Delaware increases with the number of out-of-state investors – we use 
data from a sample of VC-backed startup firms.  This section describes our data and 
provides summary statistics on state of incorporation and reincorporation for the firms in 
our sample. 
2.1. Data Sources 
Data were obtained from the VentureXpert (VX) database provided by Thomson 
Financial.  Our sample is limited to US-based startups that received their first round of VC 
investment between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002, and received at least $5 
million in total VC financing over all rounds of investment.6  These criteria yield a sample of 
1,998 startup firms.7   
VX does not include firm domicile in its database.  We use public records data from 
Lexis-Nexis and the Delaware Secretary of State to match each firm in our sample with 
                                                          
6 Limiting our analysis to firms that received at least $5 million in financing enables us to focus on higher 
quality firms, where domicile is likely to matter more. 
7 We collected the data in 2008.  Because VentureXpert appears to have since added information about other 
firms not in the database in 2008, the same criteria would yield a larger sample if the data were collected 
today.  However, we have no reason to believe that increasing the sample size would significantly affect our 
results. 
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incorporation records.8  Matching based on the firm name provided by VX, we identified 
state of incorporation for 1,850 out of 1,998 firms in our original sample, a 93% match rate. 
These 1,850 firms received a total of 6,217 rounds of financing.  
 
2.2. Sample Description 
Tables 1 through 4 provide descriptive statistics for the 1,850 firms in our sample.  
Sample firms are primarily high-tech businesses, with almost half in a computer-related 
sector (Table 4).  Startups in our sample received, on average, $36.8 million over 3.6 
rounds of VC financing (Table 1).  The median firm received funding from 5 different 
investors, of which 2 were out-of-state investors.  Table 4 shows exit outcomes as reported 
by VX.  Of the 1850 firms, approximately one third of the sample firms had an exit – either 
an IPO (n=103) or a private sale (n=536).  The remaining two thirds were, as of 2008, 
either defunct (n=295) or active (n=916).  
[ADD TABLES 1, 2, 3 & 4 ABOUT HERE]      
 
2.3. State of Incorporation and Reincorporation 
For each firm in our sample, we collect data on the initial state of incorporation and 
any subsequent reincorporation.  Consistent with studies of public firms (Daines, 2002; 
Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003) and private firms (Dammann and Schundlein, 2011), we find 
that a startup firm typically makes a binary choice, incorporating either in its home state or 
                                                          
8 The Lexis-Nexis public records database includes domicile data (via secretary-of-state filings) for locally 
domiciled firms of all states except Delaware.  Information about Delaware domicile was obtained from (a) 
doing-business forms filed by Delaware-domiciled firms in their home states and (b) the Delaware’s Secretary 
of State webpage (https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/GINameSearch.jsp).    
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in Delaware.  Table 2 shows that just over two-thirds (67.8%) of sample firms choose 
Delaware as the initial state of incorporation, and, of the remaining 32.2%, most (28.7%) 
incorporate in their home states.  Only 3.5% of sample firms choose to incorporate in a 
jurisdiction other than Delaware or their home state.   
Larger firms are more likely to incorporate in Delaware and therefore less likely to 
incorporate in their home state.  Table 3 divides sample firms into quintiles based on total 
amount of VC financing received over the life of the firm, and reports the final state of 
incorporation for each quintile. 9  In the largest quintile, 89% of the firms use Delaware; in 
the smallest quintile, only 69% of the firms use Delaware.  
The bimodal choice – between Delaware and home state – is especially pronounced 
at the final state of incorporation.  Figure 1 displays each firm’s final state of incorporation 
relative to its headquarter location.  Approximately 98% of firms choose to incorporate 
either in their home states (the diagonal cluster of points) or in Delaware (the horizontal 
cluster of points).  
[ADD FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
When reincorporation occurs, it is almost always into Delaware.  Moving from the 
initial to the final state of incorporation, Delaware’s share increases from 67.8% to 78.8%, 
while home-state share declines from 28.7% to 19.4% and other states’ share declines from 
3.5% to 1.8% (Table 2).  Almost one third of firms originally incorporated in their home 
states reincorporate into Delaware.  Table 5 provides detailed data on reincorporations in 
our sample.  A total of 217 firms reincorporated, out of which 205 (approximately 95%) 
                                                          
9 “Final state” is the state of incorporation at the time of exit (IPO or acquisition) or, if there has been no exit 
event, the state of incorporation as of 2008. 
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switched into Delaware. This change is typically made in connection with a new round of 
financing, often the first or second round (Table 5).  
[ADD TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.4. Investor Location and Delaware Incorporation 
Tables 6 and 7 report the likelihood of Delaware incorporation as a function of the 
mix of in-state and out-of-state investors.  Results are separately displayed for first-round 
financings (Table 6) and later-round financings (Table 7).  The general pattern, for both 
first-round and later-round financings, is that each additional out-of-state investor 
significantly increases the likelihood of Delaware incorporation, whereas the number of in-
state investors has little effect on domicile choice.  For example, in later rounds (Table 7), 
firms receiving financing from one out-of-state investor incorporate in Delaware with 71%-  
79% probability, whereas firms receiving financing from four-plus out-of-state investors 
incorporate in Delaware with 92%-94% probability.  Moving from one out-of-state investor 
to four or more out-of-state investors is associated with an approximate 17% increase in 
the probability of Delaware incorporation, whereas a similar change in the number of in-
state investors (moving from one to more than four) is associated with only a 2% increase 
in the likelihood of Delaware incorporation.  These results are consistent with a lingua-
franca effect.  Out-of-state investors exhibit a clear preference for Delaware incorporation, 
whereas in-state investors appear indifferent between home-state and Delaware 
incorporation.   
[ADD TABLES 6 & 7 ABOUT HERE] 
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2.5. Investors’ State-Dependent Domicile Preferences 
We examine the use of Delaware within each VC’s portfolio of investments.  Figure 2 
compares the likelihoods of Delaware incorporation in two situations: when a VC invests in 
its home state and when the same VC invests out-of-state.  For all VCs in our sample that 
participated in at least 30 rounds of financing, the graph plots the likelihood that a portfolio 
firm will incorporate in Delaware as a function of whether the startup is headquartered in 
the same state as the VC investor.  Results are displayed according to the fraction of out-of-
state firms in the VC’s portfolio (the horizontal axis).  Consequently, for each VC, Figure 2 
plots two points: the likelihood of Delaware incorporation when investing (i) in-state and 
(ii) out-of-state.  The gap between these points is a rough measure of the lingua-franca 
effect.  Figure 2 also includes three Lowess curves reflecting the likelihood of Delaware 
domicile for (i) out-of-state portfolio firms (solid line), (ii) in-state portfolio firms (dotted 
line), and (iii) in-state portfolio firms where all VCs in the round are located in the startup’s 
home state (dashed line). 
Figure 2 indicates that the lingua-franca effect arises primarily from VCs that invest 
less than 70% of their portfolio out-of-state (what we call “regional” VCs).  VCs that invest 
principally out-of-state (what we call “national” VCs) use Delaware with higher frequency. 
For national VCs, the choice between Delaware and home-state law does not seem to 
depend on where the startup is located; they are likely to use Delaware domicile both when 
investing at home and when investing out-of-state.  Why? National VCs may invest out-of-
state with such frequency that they are less familiar with the corporate law in their home 
states; they may migrate to Delaware simply to standardize contract terms across all the 
firms in their portfolios; or they may believe that Delaware law is better. Overall, however, 
Figure 2 supports the lingua-franca hypothesis and shows that, in the aggregate, VCs 
behave differently when investing in-state than when they go out-of-state.   
  
17 
 For illustrative purposes, we report results from four well-known California VC 
firms in Table 8.  For example, Kleiner Perkins is almost 36 percentage points more likely 
to use Delaware incorporation if it invests in a startup located outside California than if it 
invests in a startup located in California that relies 100% on California-based VCs (100% 
versus 64.3%). While Kleiner Perkins exhibits a fairly strong lingua-franca tendency – 
using Delaware domicile for all of its out-of-state investments – it is not particularly 
unusual.  Indeed, the four VCs listed are on average 32 percentage points more likely to use 
Delaware when investing outside California than when investing in California with other 
California-based VCs (94.9% versus 62.5%).  Consistent with the lingua-franca effect, the 
use of Delaware law for in-state investments increases when “foreign” (non-California) VCs 
participate in the financing.    
The domicile choices of these California VCs, and of VCs in aggregate, strongly 
suggest that the choice of Delaware domicile cannot be fully accounted for by unobserved 
dimensions of a startup that have nothing to do with the identity of their investors.  For 
unobserved startup dimensions to account for the difference in domiciling decisions, one 
would need to believe that home-state firms in VCs’ portfolios are, in aggregate, 
substantially different along these unobserved dimensions than their portfolio companies 
outside of their home state. To us, this seems unlikely. 
[ADD Figure 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3. Baseline Empirical Results 
This section tests the lingua-franca hypothesis.  We first examine the choice of legal 
domicile made at the first round of VC financing (§ 3.1), and then consider reincorporation 
into Delaware in connection with a subsequent financing round (§ 3.2).   
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3.1. State of Incorporation at the First Round of VC Financing 
We estimate, using logit regression, the following equation for choice of Delaware 
incorporation in connection with the first round of VC financing: 
Delaware =  α  +  β1*Out-of-State Investors  +  β2*Local Exposure  +  β*X  +  ε   (1) 
where ε is the error term and X  is a vector of included control variables.  The dependent 
variable, Delaware, equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware at the time of the first 
round of financing, and zero otherwise.10  For purposes of equation (1), all variables are 
defined as of the first round of VC financing (t = 1). 
 There are two explanatory variables of interest: Out-of-State Investors, which equals 
the number of out-of-state investors participating in the round; and Local Exposure, which 
equals the number of Out-of-State Investors in the financing round that have previously 
financed a firm (within our sample of 1,850 startups) that was incorporated in the startup’s 
home state.  Local Exposure can be understood as a rough proxy for out-of-state investors’ 
familiarity with the local dialect: home-state corporate law.  Unfortunately, Local Exposure 
only includes experience within our sample period; it does not reflect any familiarity based 
on a VC’s investment activity prior to 2000.  Consequently, Local Exposure may be an 
                                                          
10 Our dependent variable compares Delaware domicile against both in-state and other-state domicile, 
lumping these last two groups into one category.  Firms that incorporate in a state other than Delaware or 
their home state are somewhat smaller than firms incorporated in their home state (fewer investors, less 
financing, fewer rounds of financing).  The inclusion of the “other-state” domicile firms in the same category 
as in-state firms, does not, however, substantially impact our results:  we re-estimate the models reported in 
Table 10 excluding “other-state” firms and find qualitatively similar results.  
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unreliable proxy for out-of-state investor familiarity with home-state law in financing 
rounds occurring early in our sample period. 
Out-of-State Investors and Local Exposure provide two proxies for investor 
familiarity.  The combination of the two variables lets us separately measure the marginal 
effect of (i) an Out-of-State Investor with no prior exposure to the startup’s home-state law 
[= β1] as well as of (ii) an Out-of-State Investor with at least some prior exposure to the 
startup’s home state law [= β1 + β2].  The lingua-franca hypothesis predicts that β1 > 0, and 
β2 < 0. In words, each additional out-of-state investor will increase the likelihood of 
Delaware incorporation, but the marginal effect will be smaller for out-of-state investors 
who have past experience with the startup’s home-state law.  
 We also control for various firm-level and state-level variables that may affect a 
startup’s state of incorporation.  Table 9 defines the variables used throughout the 
remainder of this section and provides summary statistics for each. 
[ADD TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Table 10 presents regression results, reporting logit marginal effects with all 
variables at their mean values.  We first estimate Delaware as a function of our two 
treatment variables: Out-of-State Investors and Local Exposure (model 1).  Models 2 and 3 
add additional explanatory variables that control for various firm-level characteristics of 
each business, including (i) the total number of investors (Total Investors), (ii) the number 
of in-state investors (In-State Investors)11, (iii) the amount invested in the round 
                                                          
11 Because the identities of a startup’s investors are not always disclosed in VX, we are able to include Out-of-
State Investors, In-State Investors, and Number of Investors in a single regression model without introducing 
perfect multicollinearity among the right-hand-side variables. 
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(Investment ($M)), (iv) the aggregate amount invested in the firm across all rounds of 
financing (Size Proxy ($M)), which we use as a proxy for the size and complexity of the 
firm,12 (v) the average age, based on year founded, of the VC firms participating in the 
round (VC Reputation),13 and dummy variables for (vi) firm sector and (vii) year of 
financing.   
In model 4, we add control variables for features of home-state corporate law that 
may affect choice of domicile. First, we add three variables used in Kahan (2006): Judicial 
Quality, Flexibility, and ATS Index.  Judicial Quality addresses the possibility that firms 
incorporate in Delaware because it is seen as having a higher-quality judiciary than their 
home states (Romano, 1993); Flexibility indicates the level of flexibility given to parties by 
home-state law to design their internal governance arrangements (Kahan, 2006); and ATS 
Index captures the strength of anti-takeover protections offered by the home state (Kahan, 
2006).  ATS Index should be relevant only if the firm expects to go public.   
Second, we record Franchise Tax for the startup’s home state.  Franchise Tax reflects 
the change in home-state fees when a firm incorporates at home rather than in Delaware.  
If a firm domiciles at home rather than in Delaware, it must pay its home state (a) an initial 
incorporation fee and (b) an annual franchise tax and/or report fee.  But the firm will avoid 
paying its home state (c) a “foreign qualification fee” and (d) (sometimes) an annual foreign 
report fee.  Thus, we define Franchise Tax as (a) + (b) – (c) – (d).14  Tax rates are defined as 
                                                          
12 While the aggregate amount invested in the firms across all rounds of financing is obviously not known 
with precision before the final financing round, we assume that it correlates with parties’ ex ante expectations 
(as of the first financing round) as to the firm’s eventual size and complexity.   
13 VC firm age is used as a proxy for reputation (Gompers, 1996; Hsu, 2004). 
14 By incorporating in its home state rather than Delaware, the firm will also avoid paying (e) franchise taxes 
charged by Delaware.  Since Delaware’s franchise tax does not depend on a firm’s physical location, item (e) is 
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of January 1, 2000, and we assume 100,000 shares outstanding (par value = $.001/share).  
Most states charge the same flat fees to both home-state and Delaware-domiciled firms 
(Kahan and Kamar 2001, 2002). For these states, Franchise Tax is zero.   
Third, to control for the possibility that differences in contracting practices between 
east and west coast firms affect incorporation-related decisions (Bengtsson and Ravid, 
2009), we record whether the firm is headquartered in a state located west of the 
Mississippi River (West of Mississippi).  Fourth, to address other potential incorporation 
network benefits, we control for the number of publicly held firms incorporated in the 
startup’s home state (State Inc. Count) and for whether home-state corporate law is based 
on the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA state).15    
Finally, in model 5 we include a set of dummy variables for each state.16  Due to 
limited within-state variation in the dependent variable, models 4 and 5 are restricted to 
startups headquartered in states with at least ten observations and are thus estimated on a 
smaller sample of firms (n=1,774).    
[ADD TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In each model reported in Table 10, we find results consistent with the lingua-franca 
hypothesis.  As predicted, Out-of-State Investors has a positive and significant effect on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
essentially a constant term that would apply equally to all firms in our sample.  Thus, (e) does not need to be 
included in the definition of Franchise Tax. 
15 The first of these network variables, State Inc. Count, is also used by Daines (2002), while the second, MBCA 
State, is used by Kahan (2006).  
16 Due to perfect multicollinearity, we cannot include the corporate law variables and the state dummies in 
the same regression model.   
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Delaware incorporation, while Local Exposure has a negative effect.  Adding an Out-of-State 
Investor increases the likelihood of Delaware incorporation by approximately six to eight 
percentage points [β1].  By contrast, In-State Investors have negligible impact on choice of 
domicile.  Consistent with familiarity driving domicile choices, an Out-of-State Investor’s 
demand for Delaware incorporation is moderated by Local Exposure (i.e. β2 is negative in all 
models).17  If an Out-of-State Investor has at least some prior exposure to the startup’s 
home-state law (as observed within our sample period) the firm is somewhat less likely to 
incorporate in Delaware and more likely to incorporate in the home state. These results are 
broadly consistent with the lingua-franca explanation.    
The magnitude of the lingua franca effect is material: moving from zero to two out-
of-state investors in the first round of financing increases the likelihood of Delaware 
incorporation from 68% to 82%, nearly halving the likelihood (32% versus 18%) that a 
startup will incorporate in any state other than Delaware.  These forecasts are based on 
estimates from model 3 with all other controls held at their mean values. 
Finally, we compare the impact of out-of-state investors to two legal factors 
identified in prior research: home-state legal flexibility and judicial quality.  Consistent 
with Kahan (2006), we find that firms are more likely to incorporate in their home states 
                                                          
17 It should be noted that the marginal effect for Local Exposure is statistically significant only in model 3.  As 
discussed above, there are measurement limitations for Local Exposure in the first round of financing; these 
limitations are likely to reduce statistical significance.  To address this concern, we re-estimated model 2 with 
all financing rounds occurring prior to 2001 removed, reducing the number of observations to 573.  In an 
unreported regression on this reduced sample, we find a marginal effect of -.057 (statistically significant at 
the 1% level) for Local Exposure; the coefficient estimate for Out-of-State Investors remains positive and 
significant.  It is also worth noting that even on the full sample (where there are greater measurement 
limitations for Local Exposure than in the reduced sample) our baseline results are still as predicted by the 
lingua-franca hypothesis: β1 > 0 and β2 < 0.     
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and less likely to choose Delaware if the home-state law provides greater flexibility, and if 
the home state is perceived to have a higher-quality judiciary.   
To compare the relative magnitude of these two explanations with lingua franca, we 
examine the likelihood of Delaware incorporation when each variable is one standard 
deviation below its mean, as compared to one standard deviation above its mean.  Based on 
estimates from model 4, when moving from one standard deviation below its mean to one 
standard deviation above its mean, Out-of-State Investors is associated with a 16 
percentage point increase (from 69% to 85%) in the likelihood of Delaware incorporation, 
while Judicial Quality is associated with an 8 percentage point decline (from 81% to 73%), 
and Flexibility is associated with an 11 percentage point decline (from 82% to 71%).  While 
each of these effects is economically meaningful, lingua franca appears to have a larger 
effect on incorporation choice than flexibility or judicial quality.  
   
3.2. Reincorporation in Delaware in Subsequent Financing Rounds 
The results reported above are limited to incorporation decisions around first 
rounds of financing.  We now turn to examine whether the arrival of out-of-state investors 
in subsequent rounds causes firms that initially incorporated in their home states to 
reincorporate in Delaware afterwards.   
Of firms originally incorporated in their home states, almost one third ultimately 
switched to Delaware; such reincorporation typically occurs in connection with a new 
round of financing.  To take advantage of this longitudinal variation, we treat each financing 
round as a separate observation, creating panel data indexed by startup firm (‘i') and round 
of financing (‘t’).  We limit our attention to situations in which the firm was not already 
incorporated in Delaware, because firms already incorporated in Delaware are not ‘at risk’ 
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of reincorporating in Delaware.18  Our panel thus consists of a sub-sample of 594 firms and 
1546 financing rounds. 
One advantage of panel data is that we can isolate within-firm variation, eliminating 
bias due to time-constant unobserved effects.  To take advantage of this feature, we 
construct a first-difference transformation of equation (1):      
Δ Delaware = β1*[Δ Out-of-State Investors] + β2*[Δ Local Exposure] + β*[ΔX] + ε (2) 
where ‘Δ’ indicates the change from round t-1 to round t, and X  is a vector of included 
control variables.19  The first-differences approach eliminates all time-constant variables, 
both observed and unobserved effects (Wooldridge, 2002).20  This forces us to remove 
time-constant variables, such as sector and most of the state-level control variables. 
Before proceeding to multivariate regression results, we note the positive 
correlation between an increase in the number of out-of-state investors and 
reincorporation in Delaware (Figure 3).  The horizontal axis shows the change in the 
                                                          
18 If a firm reincorporates into Delaware in round t, any future rounds of financing are excluded.  Our analysis 
can be understood as a discrete-time hazard model: we estimate the hazard of switching to Delaware in 
round t, conditional on surviving outside Delaware through the previous t-1 rounds (Shumway, 2001; 
Jenkins, 1995).   
19 We include observations from the first round if the business was incorporated in its home state prior to the 
first VC round.  In first-round observations, the t-1 value of each variable is zero.  To address the possibility 
that first-round reincorporations are different from reincorporations in subsequent rounds, we include 
separate dummy variables for each round of financing. We find qualitatively similar results when limiting our 
analysis to follow-on rounds of financing.   
20 Removal of unobserved effects can also be accomplished through a firm fixed-effect model.  We chose to 
use the first-differences model rather than a firm fixed-effect model to focus on the change from one round to 
the next, rather than the difference between each observation and the average for the firm.  We find similar 
results (unreported) using a firm fixed-effect model.  
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number of out-of-state investors since the previous round (Δ Out-of-State Investors), while 
the vertical axis measures the likelihood of reincorporation in Delaware.  For example, if a 
firm adds 3 out-of-state investors in a new round of financing, there is approximately a 
23% probability that the firm will reincorporate in Delaware in connection with the new 
financing.  By contrast, if there is no change in the number of out-of-state investors in a new 
round, the likelihood of reincorporation is only 6%. 
[ADD FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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 Reincorporation regression results are reported in Table 11.  Model 6 regresses Δ 
Delaware on our two treatment variables: Δ Out-of-State Investors and Δ Local Exposure.  
Models 7 and 8 add the set of firm-level controls described in §3.1.  Model 8 also includes 
dummy variables for each round of financing.   
The results reported in Table 11 are consistent with the lingua-franca hypothesis.  
The arrival of out-of-state investors increases the likelihood of reincorporation in 
Delaware.  We also find that increased familiarity (Δ Local Exposure) with home-state law 
decreases the likelihood of reincorporation in Delaware.  These results are significant at 
the 1% level in each model reported in Table 11.  Reincorporation in Delaware is (i) most 
likely to occur when adding out-of-state investors with no prior exposure to home-state 
law, (ii) of intermediate likelihood when adding out-of-state investors with some prior 
exposure to home-state law, and (iii) least likely to occur when adding in-state investors. 
Importantly, the first-differences regression format eliminates the influence of time-
constant unobserved effects on domicile and thereby removes many plausible sources of 
bias in our estimates of Out-of-State Investors and Local Exposure. For example, one might 
  
26 
be concerned that Local Exposure reflects in part the quality of home-state law, not just out-
of-state VCs’ familiarity with it.  But as long as the quality of home-state law is stable over 
our sample period, it will not bias the coefficient for Local Exposure.  The first-differences 
regression results thus provide further support for the lingua-franca hypothesis.   
 
4. VC Fixed-Effect Regressions 
Because out-of-state investors are not randomly assigned to our sample firms, there 
is a risk that omitted variables may correlate with both the state of incorporation and the 
source of VC financing.  For example, VCs that invest mostly out-of-state (“national VCs”) 
may use Delaware law with higher frequency than VCs that invest mostly in-state 
(“regional VCs”), whether they are investing in-state or out-of-state. If national VCs tend to 
rely on Delaware law, and national VCs tend to choose Delaware law for reasons other than 
lingua franca (for example, because of the inherent quality of Delaware law), we may 
observe a correlation between out-of-state investors and the use of Delaware law that is 
not driven by the lingua-franca effect but rather by the unobserved characteristics of the 
VCs financing each startup. 
To address this concern, we employ a VC fixed-effect analysis where each VC 
investment to a firm in their portfolio is treated as a separate observation.  To ensure 
meaningful within-group variation, we limit our analysis to VC firms that participated in at 
least 30 rounds of financing involving startup firms in our sample.  This gives us a sub-
sample of 173 VC firms and 13,845 portfolio investments by this group of VC firms – 
including 3,397 first-round investments and 5,351 at-risk follow-on round investments.  
Using this sample of portfolio investments, we use fixed-effect regression to estimate the 
following function:    
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Delaware = α +  β1*Out-of-State VC  +  β2*Exposed VC  +  β*X  +  VCi  +    ε (3) 
where Out-of-State VC equals one if the VC investor is headquartered in a different state 
than the startup firm, and zero if both the VC and the startup are headquartered in the 
same state; Exposed VC equals one if the VC investor had previously invested in another 
startup firm incorporated in the startup’s home state, and zero otherwise; X is a vector of 
included control variables; and VCi are a series of fixed-effects for each VC firm.  The 
inclusion of the VC fixed effect lets us observe how each VC’s behavior changes when 
investing in-state as opposed to out-of-state.   
The vector X includes other factors which could affect the choice of domicile: the 
total amount invested in the round (Investment ($M)); the number of other out-of-state VCs 
participating in the financing round (Other Out-of-State VC); the total number of other VCs 
participating in the financing round (Other VC Total); and dummy variables for Sector, Year, 
and Round.   
We separately estimate equation (3) for the first round of financing (models 9 and 
10), and for follow-on rounds in which the firm was at risk of reincorporating into 
Delaware (models 11 and 12).  In models 10 and 12, we also include all of the state-level 
variables used in model 4 to control for differences in state corporate law that may impact 
the VC’s choice of domicile.  To avoid double-counting subsequent investments made by the 
same VCs, Models 11 and 12 only include the first investment made by each VC into the 
firm, giving us a sample of 4,432 for model 11 and a sample of 4,282 for model 12.  Results 
are reported in Table 12.          
[ADD TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
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For both incorporation in the first round of financing (models 9 and 10) and 
reincorporation in subsequent rounds (models 11 and 12), we find that VC investors are 
approximately 5 percentage points more likely to contract for Delaware incorporation 
when investing out-of-state.  This result is statistically significant in both models.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of fixed effects for each VC means this result is not driven by 
unobserved differences between the VC firms financing each startup.  Regarding our 
second treatment variable – Exposed VC – our results are less conclusive.  We find a null 
result for the first round of financing.  As noted above, this is likely due to the fact that our 
measure of Exposed VC is less accurate in first-round financings.  For follow-on financings, 
the coefficient on Exposed VC is negative, as predicted by the lingua-franca explanation, but 
not quite significant at normal levels.  Overall, the VC fixed-effect results support the 
lingua-franca explanation for the use of Delaware domicile, and provide further 
confirmation that our findings are not driven by unobserved differences between the VC 
firms financing different startups. 21 
 
5. Alternative Causal Pathways  
Even if the presence of out-of-state investors increases the likelihood of Delaware 
incorporation, this effect might have an explanation other than lingua franca.  In this 
section, we consider four alternative explanations for this relationship and discuss why 
they are unlikely to explain away the lingua franca results: (1) neutral venue; (2) home-
state bias; (3) California effect; and (4) startup’s law firm.  
                                                          
21 In addition to the VC fixed-effect analysis reported here, we also estimated a two-stage least squares model 
using the supply of in-state funds as an instrument for the number of out-of-state investors and found results 
consistent with the lingua-franca explanation.  These results are not reported, but are available upon request.  
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Neutral Venue  
One might believe that the correlation between out-of-state investors and Delaware 
incorporation is due to the preference for a neutral litigation venue: an out-of-state 
investor may prefer that a startup incorporate in Delaware rather than stay at home so that 
the out-of-state investor can have an unbiased adjudicator rather than a home-state judge 
in the event of a dispute.   
While this explanation is plausible on the surface, it is important to remember that 
Delaware domicile is neither necessary nor sufficient for an out-of-state investor to obtain 
a neutral venue. Delaware incorporation is not necessary to obtain a neutral venue because 
the parties could contract directly over venue through a choice of forum clause in the 
charter or elsewhere that requires the parties to resolve disputes in a specified venue.  For 
example, the corporation’s charter could require all disputes to be resolved by arbitrators 
or in the courts of a particular state.  If parties wish to have their disputes heard outside of 
home-state courts, they can easily do so without domiciling in Delaware. 
Delaware domicile is not sufficient to ensure that a Delaware court will handle a 
dispute because suits arising in Delaware-domiciled firms can be (and often are) brought 
elsewhere, typically in federal or state courts where the firms are headquartered (Armour, 
Black, and Cheffins, 2012).  And although litigation between participants in startups is 
relatively uncommon, it is also easy to find cases involving Delaware-domiciled firms that 
are adjudicated outside of Delaware.22  As the Delaware chancery court has reminded 
lawyers, the only way to ensure that disputes arising in Delaware-domicile firms are heard 
                                                          
22 See, Flying Disc Investments LP v. Baker Communications Fund II (Superior Court of California, County of 
San Francisco, 2009)(litigation by founders against New York VC investors in Delaware-domiciled California 
firm); John P. Kennedy v. Venrock Associates (U.S.C.A. 7th Circuit) (348 F.3d 584)(2003)(litigation by common 
shareholders against New York VC investors in Delaware-domiciled Illinois firm).   
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in Delaware is to put a forum selection provision in the charter.23  As far as we know, such 
provisions have not been widely used by startups.  Thus, the desire for a neutral venue 
(that is, to avoid the bias of home-state judges) does not appear capable of explaining our 
results that a firm is more likely to domicile in Delaware if it has more out-of-state 
investors. 
 
Home-State Familiarity 
 Almost all firms domicile either in Delaware or in their home state. Thus, the 
positive correlation between the fraction of out-of-state investors and Delaware domicile 
implies a positive correlation between the fraction of in-state investors and home-state 
domicile.  One might think that these results are driven not by Delaware’s use as a lingua 
franca, but rather by in-state investors’ relative familiarity with, and thus excessive use of, 
home-state law.  In particular, the observed patterns might appear consistent with a world 
in which (1) Delaware law is of higher intrinsic quality than in-state law; and (2) each in-
state investor must incur learning costs to use Delaware law, but not home-state law. In 
such a world, firms financed mostly or entirely by in-state investors would often choose 
home-state law to save learning costs even when the investors know that their law is 
otherwise inferior to Delaware’s. 
 If home-state familiarity were driving our results, we would expect an increase in 
the number of in-state investors (everything else equal) to increase the likelihood of home-
state domicile. However, we find (tables 5 and 6) that the number of in-state investors has 
little impact on the choice between home-state and Delaware incorporation.  This finding 
                                                          
23 In re Revlon Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (2010).  For a discussion of forum selection clauses, see 
Armour, Black and Cheffins (2012 at pp. 1392-94). 
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suggests that while out-of-state investors have a strong preference for Delaware (when 
they invest out-of-state), in-state investors are relatively indifferent between home-state 
and Delaware domicile. Our results thus appear more consistent with lingua franca than 
with home-state familiarity.24 
California Effect 
More than 40% of our sample firms are headquartered in California.  VC norms 
(Suchman and Cahill, 1996) and contracting practices (Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009) may be 
different in California than elsewhere. More importantly, California has an unusual long-
arm statute (CA Corp. Code § 2115) that purports to extend numerous substantive 
requirements of California corporate law to “quasi-California firms” – firms domiciled out-
of-state that have most of their assets and shareholders located in California (Fried and 
Ganor, 2006).  Section 2115 thus subjects a California-based firm domiciled in Delaware to 
two sets of corporate laws (California and Delaware) when there are relatively few out-of-
state investors, making a Delaware domicile less attractive for such a firm. If Delaware 
domicile is generally beneficial, we would expect § 2115 to produce a correlation between 
out-of-state investors and Delaware domicile in California, even absent a lingua-franca 
effect. One may thus be concerned that our results are driven by a “California effect” that 
has nothing to do with lingua franca.  
                                                          
24 Further evidence that home-state familiarity is not driving our results comes from the fact that firms rarely 
incorporate in a state other than Delaware or the firm’s home state.  If home-state familiarity were driving 
our results, we would expect to see more firms incorporating in a third jurisdiction, namely the out-of-state 
investors’ home state.  For example, if a group of California VCs finance a startup located outside California, 
home-state familiarity would predict that, everything else equal, these VCs would favor California 
incorporation for the out-of-state firm, not Delaware.  We do not observe this behavior (see Figure 1).  
Instead, Delaware functions as a national standard regardless of investor location, a pattern that is more 
consistent with lingua franca than with home-state familiarity. 
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To address this concern, we exclude firms located in California and then re-estimate 
equations (1) and (2) on a subsample of 1091 firms headquartered outside California.  
Regression results for the first round of financing are reported in model 13, and results for 
reincorporation are in model 15 (Table 13).  In both models the exclusion of California 
firms does not qualitatively change our findings.   
[ADD TABLE 13 HERE] 
 
Startup’s Law Firm: Regional or National 
The identity of the law firm representing the startup is only reported in VX for about 
half of the firms in our sample.  Consequently, the regressions reported in Sections 3 and 4 
do not control for the identity of the startup’s law firm, even though that law firm’s 
familiarity with Delaware law (relative to home-state law) may itself affect the choice of 
domicile.  For example, Daines (2002) finds that IPO firms are more likely to incorporate in 
Delaware (rather than at home) if the firm is represented by a “national” rather than a 
“regional” law firm.   
Not controlling for the source of the startup’s legal advice could bias our results 
(Bengtsson, 2009).  National law firms, for example, may help clients attract financing from 
out-of-state investors and also advise their clients to incorporate in Delaware.  If so, the 
observed correlation between out-of-state investors and Delaware domicile may not be 
due to a lingua-franca effect but rather due to the type of law firm advising the startup.25  
                                                          
25 Of course, a national law firm may prefer that all the firms it advises use Delaware law because Delaware is 
the only corporate law familiar to all the firm’s attorneys. Thus, a finding that startups advised by national 
law firms are more likely to incorporate in Delaware could itself be consistent with a type of lingua-franca 
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To address this concern, we identify the law firm representing the startup for the 
subsample of 1,022 firms (55% of the full sample) where this data is reported by VX.  
Working with this subsample of firms, we create a new variable, National Law Firm, 
equaling one if the law firm is listed by Chambers USA as a ‘national’ law firm (elite or 
highly regarded) in the area of corporate/M&A practice, and zero otherwise.26  
We then re-estimate equations (1) and (2).  For equation (1) we include National 
Law Firm as an additional explanatory variable alongside our two treatment variables and 
the firm-level controls (model 14).  For the reincorporation analysis, we cannot include 
National Law Firm as an explanatory variable because it is time-constant.  Instead, we run 
two first-difference models, one limited to firms represented by a national law firm (model 
16) and another limited to firms represented by a regional law firm (model 17).     
Consistent with Daines (2002), in the first round of financing, National Law Firms 
are more likely to cause their clients to incorporate in Delaware.  Inclusion of this variable, 
however, does not change our main findings.  The coefficient on Out-of-State Investors is 
positive and highly significant (1% level) in model 14.  Using estimates from model 14, 
when moving from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above 
its mean, Out-of-State Investors is associated with a 17 percentage point increase (from 
65% to 82%) in the likelihood of Delaware incorporation, while National Law Firm is 
associated with a 6 percentage point increase (from 71% to 77%). 
For the reincorporation analysis, we find that Δ Out-of-State Investors is positive for 
both the national law firm and regional law firm subsamples.  The reincorporation result is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
effect: one that operates through the startup’s law firm rather than one which operates through the startup’s 
investors and their attorneys.  
26 By contrast, Daines (2002) uses the number of IPOs led by each law firm during the period from 1990 to 
2000 as a proxy for whether the law firm is a national firm or regional firm. 
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only significant for the regional law firm subsample, presumably due to the small sub-
sample of startups represented by national law firms that were incorporated outside 
Delaware (n= 114).  In any event, our findings of a lingua-franca effect appears robust to 
the type of law firm representing the startup. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have put forward and tested a “lingua franca” explanation for a 
firm’s decision to domicile in Delaware rather than its home state: given that most 
attorneys are “fluent” in home-state law and Delaware law, a firm raising financing from in-
state and out-of-state investors will choose Delaware to provide in-state and out-of-state 
investors a legal language that all can speak.  Studying the domicile decisions of 1850 VC-
backed startups, we show that the lingua franca has a significant effect on domicile choices 
in our sample firms. Indeed, it is more powerful than other domicile-influencing factors 
that have been identified in the literature, such as judicial quality, the flexibility of a state’s 
corporate law, and the identity of the issuer’s attorneys.  
Our findings help explain how Delaware has been able to achieve and build on its 
dominant position in the market for corporate charters.  Its success in attracting new firms 
is, at least in part, due to investors around the country being relatively more familiar with 
Delaware corporate law than with the corporate laws of other states.  
Our study also suggests another reason why another state may have difficulty 
competing with Delaware.  That state could not succeed without convincing lawyers to 
learn a new “language”, but the expected benefit to lawyers of learning a second or third 
language will be low given that Delaware fluency already allows a corporate attorney in 
any state to communicate with most corporate attorneys in that same state and in other 
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states. As a result, lawyers will be reluctant to learn a new language. This lingua-franca 
effect further raises the barrier to competition, and may hinder desirable state-level legal 
innovation. 
Finally, while our study focuses on the domicile choices of private firms, it may well 
also have implications for public firms’ arrangements. To the extent Delaware’s dominance 
in the market for private firm charters arises because of investor familiarity, it is likely that 
Delaware’s success in the market for public firm charters is also not due solely to the 
inherent features of its corporate law, network effects, and learning benefits. We hope that 
our work will be useful to researchers taking up this question, which has important 
implications for ascertaining the desirability of domicile decisions and the corporate 
governance of public firms. 
 
 
 
References: 
Armour, John, Bernard Black, and Brian R. Cheffins. 2012. “Delaware’s Balancing Act.” Indiana Law 
Journal 87:1345-1405. 
Bar-Gill, Oren, Michal Barzuza, and Lucian Bebchuk. 2006. “The Market for Corporate Law.” Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162:134–71. 
Bebchuk, Lucian A. 1992. “Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law.” Harvard Law Review 105:1435–510. 
Bebchuk, Lucian and Alma Cohen. 2003. “Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate.” Journal of Law & 
Economics 46:383–425. 
Bebchuk, Lucian, and Assaf Hamdani. 2002. “Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition Over Corporate Charters.” Yale Law Journal 112:553–615. 
Bengtsson, Ola and S. Abraham Ravid. 2009. “The Geography of Venture Capital Contracts.” Working 
Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361827. 
Bengtsson, Ola and Dan Bernhardt. 2012. “Different Problem, Same Solution: Contract-Specialization in 
Venture Capital.” Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2021205. 
  
36 
Bengtsson, Ola. 2009. “Intermediaries in Negotiations of Complex Contracts: The Role of Attorneys in 
Venture Capital Transactions.” Working Paper. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362236. 
Bengtsson, Ola. 2011. Covenants in venture capital contracts. Management Science 57:1926-1943.  
Broughman, Brian. 2013. Independent Directors and Shared Board Control in Venture Finance, Review 
of Law & Economics 9:41-72.  
Broughman, Brian and Jesse M. Fried. 2010. “Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed 
Firms.” Journal of Financial Economics 95:384-399. 
Broughman, Brian and Jesse M. Fried. 2012. “Do VCs Use Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? Some 
Evidence from Silicon Valley.” Journal of Corporate Finance 18:1104-1120.  
Carney, William J., George B. Shepherd, and Joanna Shepherd. 2012. “Lawyers, Ignorance, and the 
Dominance of Delaware Corporate Law.” Harvard Business Law Review 2:123-151. 
Cary, William L. 1974. “Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware.” Yale Law Journal 
83:663–705. 
Church, Jeffrey and Ian King. 1993. “Bilingualism and Network Externalities.” Canadian Journal of 
Economics 26: 337-345. 
Daines, Robert. 2002. “The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms.” New York University Law Review 
77:1559–1611. 
Dammann, Jens and Matthias Schündeln. 2011. “The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held 
Corporations.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 27:79-112. 
Easterbrook, Frank H. and Daniel Fischel. 1991. The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Ferris, Stephen P., Robert M. Lawless, and Gregory Noronha. 2006. “The Influence of State Legal 
Environments on Firm Incorporation Decisions and Values.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Policy 2:1–
28. 
Fried, Jesse and Mira Ganor. 2006. “Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups.” New York 
University Law Review 81:967-1025.  
Gompers, Paul. 1995. “Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital.” Journal of 
Finance 50:1461–1489. 
Gompers, Paul. 1996. “Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry.” Journal of Financial Economics 
42: 133-156. Hellmann, Thomas. 2006. “IPOs, Acquisitions, and the Use of Convertible Securities in 
Venture Capital.” Journal of Financial Economics 81: 649-679.  
Hsu, David H. 2004. “What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?” Journal of Finance 
59:1805-1844. 
Jenkins, Stephen P. 1995. “Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration Models.” Oxford Bulletin 
of Economics and Statistics 57:129-138. 
Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar. 2001. “Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law.” Cornell 
Law Review 86:1205-1256. 
Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar. 2002. “The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law.” Stanford Law 
Review 55:679-749. 
Kahan, Marcel and Michael Klausner. 1997. “Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting 
(or ‘The Economics of Boilerplate’).” Virginia Law Review 83:713-770. 
  
37 
Kahan, Marcel. 2006. “The Demand for Corporate law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover 
Protection?” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 22:340–65. 
Kaplan, Steven and Per Strömberg. 2003. “Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: an 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts.” Review of Economic Studies 70:281–315. 
Klausner, Michael. 1995. “Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts.” Virginia Law 
Review 81:757–852. 
Kobylarz, Xenia P. 2006. “Capital Cases: Venture capitalists are finding entrepreneurs less afraid to file 
suit.” The Recorder, May 31.  
Lerner, Josh. 1995. “Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms.” Journal of Finance 50:301-
318. 
Ribstein, Larry and Bruce Kobayashi. 2001. “Choice of Form and Network Externalities." William & Mary 
Law Review 43:79-140. 
Romano, Roberta. 1993. The Genius of American Corporate Law. Washington, DC: The AEI Press.  
Romano, Roberta. 1985. “Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle.” Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization 1:225–83. 
Schmidt, Klaus. 2003. “Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance.” Journal of Finance 58:1139-
1166.  
Shumway, Tyler. 2001. “Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model.” Journal of 
Business 74:101-124. 
Subramanian, Guhan. 2002. “The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence 
on the ‘Race’ Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
150:1795–873. 
Suchman, Mark and Mia Cahill. 1996. “The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of 
Business Disputes in Silicon Valley.” Law & Social Inquiry 21:679-712. 
Winter, Ralph K. 1977. “State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation.” Journal 
of Legal Studies 6:251–92. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
  
  
38 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms 
    
 Mean Med. S.D. 
Number of Financing Rounds 3.58 3 2.19 
Number of Investors 5.91 5 3.92 
Out-of-State Investors27 2.88 2 2.76 
In-State Investors 1.82 1 1.83 
Amount Invested (in $M) 36.85 23.2 48.58 
 
Note: The sample consists of 1,850 US-based startups that received first-round VC financing between 
1/1/2000 and 12/31/2002.  
 
  
                                                          
27 The identities of a startup’s investors are not always disclosed in VentureXpert.  Consequently, the sum of 
Out-of-State Investors and In-State Investors does not necessarily equal a firm’s total Number of Investors (i.e., 
the total may include investors whose identity and location are not disclosed). 
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Table 2 
State of Incorporation 
    
 Original State of Inc.       Final State of Inc. Percent 
  Count (%) Count (%) Change 
Delaware 1254 (67.8) 1457 (78.8) +11.0% 
Home State 531 (28.7) 359 (19.4) -9.3% 
Other State28 65 (3.5) 34 (1.8) -1.7% 
 
Note: The sample consists of 1,850 US-based startups that received first-round VC financing between 
1/1/2000 and 12/31/2002.  The above table shows the number of sample firms incorporated in their home 
states, Delaware, or another state.  Data are displayed for each firm’s original and final incorporation choices.  
The difference between the original and final incorporation is due to firms changing their domicile 
(reincorporating in a different jurisdiction).   
 
  
                                                          
28 For firms choosing to incorporate in an “other state” the most commonly selected alternatives as the final 
state of incorporation are as follows: Nevada (n = 5); California (n=4); Massachusetts (n = 3); Ohio (n=3); and 
Pennsylvania (n=3). 
  
40 
Table 3 
Final State of Incorporation (%) Sorted by Firm Size Quintile 
  
 Smallest 
1 2 3 4 
Largest 
5 
Delaware 69.6 75.4 79.6 79.2 89.2 
Home State 26.7 22.1 18.8 19.2 10.8 
Other State 3.6 2.5 1.6 1.6 0 
 
Note: The sample consists of 1,850 US-based startups that received first-round VC financing between 
1/1/2000 and 12/31/2002.  Firm size quintile is based on the total amount of financing raised by each firm 
over all rounds of investment.   
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Table 4 
Exit Status and Industry Sector 
     
 Count 
DE Original  
Count (%) 
DE Final 
Count (%) 
Percent 
Change 
Exit Status     
IPO 103 76 (73.8%) 96 (93.2%) +19.4% 
Acquisition 536 367 (68.4%) 414 (77.2%) +8.8% 
Active 916 599 (65.4%) 719 (78.5%) +13.1% 
Defunct 295 212 (71.8%) 228 (77.3%) +5.5% 
     
Sector     
Computer-Related 905 615 (67.9%) 710 (78.5%) +10.6% 
Non-High-Tech 99 58 (58.5%) 70 (70.7%) +12.2% 
Communications/Media 366 255 (69.6%) 286 (78.1%) +8.5% 
Biotech 129 95 (73.6%) 110 (85.3%) +11.7% 
Medical/Life Sciences 158 110 (69.6%) 135 (85.4%) +15.8% 
Semiconductor/Other 
Electronic 
193 121 (62.7%) 146 (75.6%) +12.9% 
 
Note: The sample consists of 1,850 US-based startups that received first-round VC financing between 
1/1/2000 and 12/31/2002.  The above table shows the exit status and industry sector of the sample firms, 
and reports the likelihood of Delaware incorporation for each category. 
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of state of incorporation relative to headquarters location.  For ease of 
presentation, Figure 1 includes results only from firms located in states with at least 15 
observations (with the exception of Delaware and Nevada). Delaware and Nevada are included 
because they represent important chartering destinations. The graph is jittered to avoid points 
appearing directly on top of each other. 
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Table 5 
Reincorporation 
   
 Count Percent 
Reincorporation Destination   
In Delaware 205 94.5% 
In home state29 7 3.2% 
In other state30 5 2.3% 
Total  217 100% 
   
Reincorporation Timing (into DE only, n=205) 31   
1st Round (or earlier) 116 56.6% 
2nd Round 33 16.1% 
3rd Round 22 10.7% 
4th Round 9 4.4% 
5th Round (or later) 11 5.4% 
After last round of financing 14 6.8% 
Total 205 100% 
 
Note: The above table provides data on the destination and timing of reincorporation from a sample of 1,850 
US-based startups that received first round VC financing between 1/1/2000 and 12/31/2002. 
   
 
  
                                                          
29 Of the 7 firms moving to home-state domicile, 4 were in California and there was 1 in each of Texas, 
Kentucky and Maryland. 
30 Of firms switching to a third-state domicile, 2 went to Nevada, and Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia each 
got 1. 
31 Reincorporation after the first round of financing typically occurs within a six-month window (3 months on 
either side) of a new round of financing. When reincorporation does not occur within 3 months of any round, 
we assume that reincorporation is in connection with the subsequent round of financing.  A firm’s 
management may anticipate that subsequent investors will request Delaware incorporation, and thus decide 
to reincorporate in advance of the new financing round.  To determine whether this assumption affects our 
analysis, we recode the 32 follow-on reincorporations that are not within 3 months of any financing round as 
if the reincorporation occurred in connection with the previous round of financing.  This alternative coding 
does not substantively affect the regression results reported below.   
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Table 6 
Delaware Incorporation and Out-of-State Investors  
in the First-Round of Financing 
  Number of Out-of-State Investors  
  0 1 2 3+ 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
 
In
-S
ta
te
 In
ve
st
o
rs
 0  73.4% 78.7% 93.1% 
1 63.6% 73.3% 82.0% 84.2% 
2 68.9% 81.2% 72.2% 87.5% 
3+ 70.8% 79.5% 72.8% 100% 
  Percent Delaware Incorporation 
 
Note: The above table shows the likelihood of Delaware incorporation at the first round of VC financing in 
relation to the number of in-state and out-of-state investors participating in the round. 
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Table 7 
Delaware Incorporation and Out-of-State Investors 
in Follow-on Rounds of Financing 
  Number of Out-of-State Investors  
  0 1 2 3 4+ 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
 
In
-S
ta
te
 In
ve
st
o
rs
 
0  77.6% 81.9% 79.8% 92.2% 
1 67.2% 72.1% 73.8% 82.6% 92.0% 
2 65.8% 71.1% 86.2% 83.8% 92.3% 
3 69.8% 79.2% 80.8% 81.5% 93.1% 
4+ 66.0% 77.8% 77.6% 81.5% 94.4% 
 
 Percent Delaware Incorporation 
 
Note: The above table shows the likelihood of Delaware incorporation in a follow-on round of VC financing in 
relation to the number of in-state and out-of-state investors participating in the round. 
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Figure 2: Delaware domicile for VC in-state vs. out-of-state investments.  For each VC in our sample 
that invested in at least 30 rounds of financing, we illustrate the likelihood that a portfolio firm will be 
incorporated in Delaware depending on whether or not the firm is located in the same state as the VC.  
Out-of-state investments are indicated with a plus sign, while in-state investments are indicated with a 
square.  The graph also shows three Lowess curves plotting the likelihood of Delaware domicile at each 
round of financing for (i) Out-of-State portfolio firms (solid line), (ii) In-State portfolio firms (dotted 
line), and (iii) In-State portfolio firms where all VCs in the round are located in the startup’s home state 
(dashed line).  Data are plotted over the fraction of out-of-state investments in each VC’s portfolio. 
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Table 8 
Likelihood of Delaware Incorporation (%) 
for Portfolio Firms Financed by Select California VCs 
 
% Delaware Incorporation 
Select California VCs 
In-state 
investments 
(100% Cal. VCs) 
All in-state 
investments 
Out-of-state 
investments 
Accel Partners 76.3 76.0 100.0 
Draper Fisher Jurvetson 60.6 60.3 79.7 
Kleiner Perkins 64.3 81.6 100.0 
U.S. Venture Partners 48.9 61.1 100.0 
Average  62.5% 69.8% 94.93% 
Note:  Using data from a sample of 1,850 US-based startups that received first-round VC financing between 
1/1/2000 and 12/31/2002, the above table reports the likelihood that a portfolio firm financed by each of 
the listed California VCs will incorporate in Delaware if (i) the portfolio firm is headquartered in California 
and all other VC investors providing financing to the firm are also located in California (column 2), (ii) the 
portfolio firm is headquartered in California (column 3), or (iii) the portfolio firm is headquartered outside 
Californian (column 4). 
 
  
  
48 
Table 9 
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median SD 
Delaware .769 1 .422 
Out-of-State Investors 1.765 1 1.929 
Local Exposure .390 0 .889 
Total Investors 3.725 3 2.605 
In-State Investors 1.243 1 1.399 
Investment ($M) 10.793 6.75 15.145 
Size Proxy ($M) 36.069 25 41.911 
VC Reputation 25.828 25 9.988 
Judicial Quality  2.147 2.1 .298 
Flexibility 3.144 3 .755 
ATS Index 1.848 1 1.951 
Franchise Tax  -39.270 0 230.520 
MBCA state .291 0 .454 
West of Mississippi .564 1 .496 
State Inc. Count 97.649 100 48.613 
 
Note:  The financing round (n = 6217) is the unit of analysis.  Delaware equals one if the firm is incorporated 
in Delaware, and zero otherwise; Out-of-State Investors is the number of out-of-state investors participating in 
the round; Local Exposure equals the number of out-of-state investors participating in a financing round that 
have previously financed a firm within the sample of 1,850 startups that is incorporated in the startup’s home 
state;  Total Investors is the total number of VC investors participating in the round;   In-State Investors is the 
number of in-state investors participating in the round;   Investment ($M) equals the amount of financing 
received in the new round (in millions of dollars);  Size Proxy ($M) equals the aggregate amount of financing 
that the firm received over all rounds of VC investment (in millions of dollars);  VC Reputation equals the 
average age, as of 2010, of the VC firms participating in a round of financing;   Judicial Quality equals the 
Chamber of Commerce 2001 score for each state’s judicial quality;  Flexibility is an index variable (0 to 4) 
measuring how much flexibility a state’s corporate law provides for firms to design their governance 
arrangements, following Kahan (2006);  ATS Index is an index of anti-takeover statutes, as coded in Kahan 
(2006);  Franchise Tax equals the sum of the home state’s initial incorporation fee and its annual franchise tax 
and/or annual report fee, minus the sum of the home state’s foreign qualification fee and its annual foreign 
report fee, based on tax rates as of 1/1/2000 and an assumption of 100,000 shares outstanding (par value = 
$.001/share);  MBCA state equals one if the firm is located in an MBCA state, and zero otherwise;  West of 
Mississippi equals one if the firm is located in a state located west of the Mississippi River, and zero otherwise; 
and State Inc. Count equals the number of publicly-held firms incorporated in the startup’s home state. 
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Table 10 
State of Incorporation at the First Round of VC Financing 
   Logit Marginal Effects (Dependent Variable = Delaware) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment Variable 
     
Out-of-State Investors .0793** .0600** .0652** .0612** .0581** 
 
(.010) (.016) (.017) (.015) (.019) 
Local Exposure -.0305 -.0373 -.0569* -.0411 -.0199 
 
(.028) (.030) (.025) (.029) (.025) 
Firm-Level Controls  
    
Total Investors 
 
.0235* .0205* .0174 .0153 
  
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.015) 
In-State Investors 
 
-.0058 -.0070 -.0041 -.0018 
 
 (.013) (.013) (.015) (.018) 
Investment ($M) 
 
-.0001 -.0013 -.0010 -.0014 
 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) 
Size Proxy ($M)  .0013** .0016** .0017** .0016** 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
VC Reputation 
 
-.0011 -.0019* -.0019* -.0015 
 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Sector Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies 
 
 Yes Yes Yes 
State-Level Controls  
    
Judicial Quality   
  -.1274  
 
 
  (.173)  
Flexibility  
  -.0781  
 
 
  (.075)  
ATS Index  
  -.0036  
 
 
  (.029)  
Franchise Tax   
  .0000  
 
 
  (.000)  
MBCA state  
  .0267  
 
 
  (.089)  
West of Mississippi  
  -.1953**  
 
 
  (.062)  
State Inc. Count  
  -.0006  
 
 
  (.001)  
State Dummies  
   Yes 
Observations 1847 1847 1847 1774 1774 
Pseudo R-squared .034 .049 .073 .097 .148 
Note: Using data from a cross-section of 1,850 US-based VC-backed startups, the above table reports marginal 
effects based on logit estimates evaluated at the mean of each variable.  All variables are defined as of the first 
round of VC financing.  The dependent variable is Delaware, which equals one if the firm was incorporated in 
Delaware, and zero otherwise.  All explanatory variables are defined in Table 9.  Standard errors (clustered at 
the state level and calculated via the delta-method) are reported below each coefficient estimate.  We use a 
two-sided test for statistical significance (* = 10% and ** = 1% significance).  
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Figure 3: The above figure illustrates the likelihood that a firm will reincorporate in Delaware in 
connection with a new round of financing.  The horizontal axis shows the change in the number of 
out-of-state investors since the previous round (Δ Out-of-State Investors).  Figure 3 only reports 
observations in which the firm was not incorporated in Delaware prior to the round (i.e. firms at 
‘hazard’ of reincorporating in Delaware).  
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Table 11 
Reincorporation in Delaware 
 
First-Difference Regression Model (OLS) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
Treatment Variable 
   
Out-of-State Investors .0627** .0440** .0442** 
 
(.009) (.012) (.012) 
Local Exposure -.0315** -.0233** -.0246** 
 
(.010) (.008) (.009) 
Firm-Level Controls 
   
Total Investors 
 
.0096 .0104 
 
(.007) (.007) 
In-State Investors 
 
-.0153 -.0175 
 
(.011) (.011) 
Investment ($M) 
 
-.0005 -.0004 
 
(.001) (.001) 
VC Reputation 
 
.00004** .00009** 
 
(.0000) (.0000) 
Round Dummies 
  
Yes 
Year Dummies 
  
Yes 
Observations 1546 1546 1546 
Firm Clusters 594 594 594 
R-squared .051 .067 .081 
 
Note: The above table reports first-difference regression estimates on a sample of 1,850 US-based startups 
that received first-round VC financing between 1/1/2000 and 12/31/2002.  Data are estimated for each 
financing round in which the firm was at risk of reincorporating in Delaware, a total of 594 firms and 1546 
rounds.  The dependent variable is Δ Delaware, which equals one if the business reincorporated in Delaware 
in the round of financing, and zero otherwise.  All explanatory variables are defined in Table 9.  Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate.  We use a 
two-sided test for significance (* = 10% and ** = 1% significance). 
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Table 12 
VC Fixed-Effect Regression Models 
 VC Fixed Effect 
 First Round 
At-Risk Subsequent Round 
Financing 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
Treatment Variables     
Out-of-State VC .0551* .0511* .0417* .0433* 
  (.025) (.026) (.024) (.025) 
Exposed VC .0026 .0114 -.0245 -.0227 
 
(.037) (.038) (.032) (.033) 
Control Variables     
Investment ($M) .0000* .0000* .0000** .0000** 
 
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Size Proxy ($M) .0006** .0007** .0006** .0006** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Other Out-of-State VC  .0225** .0156* .0290** .0228** 
 
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006) 
Other VC Total .0194** .0196** .0111** .0119** 
 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Judicial Quality   -.1054*  -.1023* 
  (.055)  (.051) 
Flexibility  -.0636**  -.0494* 
  (.025)  (.023) 
ATS Index  .0104  .0067 
  (.012)  (.011) 
Franchise Tax   -.0001*  -.0001* 
  (.000)  (.000) 
MBCA state  .0263  .0476* 
  (.025)  (.023) 
West of Mississippi  -.1466**  -.1425** 
  (.039)  (.034) 
State Inc. Count  -.0006  -.0003 
  (.000)  (.000) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round Dummies   Yes Yes 
VC Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3397 3272 4432 4282 
VC Clusters 172 172 173 173 
R-squared (within) .071 .099 .257 .273 
Note: The above table reports VC fixed-effect regression estimates on a sample limited to VC firms that 
participated in at least 30 rounds of financing involving the startup firms in our full sample.  The unit of 
analysis is each investment by the VC firms meeting the above qualification. The dependent variable 
(Delaware) records whether the portfolio firm was incorporated in Delaware at the time of the investment.  
The primary explanatory variable is Out-of-State VC, which equals one if the startup was headquartered in a 
different state than the VC firm, and zero otherwise.  Models 9 and 10 are limited to first-round financing 
observations.  Models 11 and 12 include subsequent at-risk rounds of financing, but are limited to the first 
investment by each VC in the company.  Remaining explanatory variables are defined in Table 9.  Robust 
standard errors are reported below each coefficient estimate.  We use a two-sided test for statistical 
significance (* = 10% and ** = 1% significance). 
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Table 13 
Robustness Checks – Alternative Explanations 
 First Round Reincorporation 
 DV = Delaware DV = Δ Delaware 
 Logit Marginal Effects First-Difference Regression (OLS) 
 Non-CA Firms 
Law Firm 
Data 
Non-CA Firms 
National Law 
Firm 
Regional Law 
Firm 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Treatment Variable 
  
   
Out-of-State Investors  .0370* .0635** .0428* .0333 .0380* 
 
(.022) (.023) (.019) (.031) (.019) 
Local Exposure  -.1164* -.0134 -.0334* -.0040 -.0356* 
 
(.065) (.034) (.016) (.008) (.016) 
Firm-Level Controls   
   
Total Investors  .0309* .0117 .0112 .0120 .0162 
 
(.018) (.017) (.013) (.015) (.011) 
In-State Investors  -.0031 -.0138 .0245 .0044 -.0281* 
 
(.027) (.019) (.024) (.021) (.016) 
Investment ($M) .0018 .0015 -.0006 -.0007 -.0006 
 
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.003) (.001) 
VC Reputation  -.0012 -.0015* .0001** .0000 .0001* 
 
(.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
National Law Firm 
 
.0498*    
  
(.021)    
Sector Dummies Yes Yes    
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round Dummies n/a n/a Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1091 1022 765 284 635 
Firm Clusters n/a n/a 324 114 223 
Wald Chi-squared 173.57 467.46 n/a n/a n/a 
R-Squared n/a n/a .122 .074 .078 
Note: Models 13 - 14 report logit marginal effects regarding the decision to incorporate in Delaware at the 
first round of financing, with Delaware as the dependent variable.  Using first-difference regression, models 
15 - 17 estimate the decision whether to reincorporate in Delaware in each subsequent financing round, with 
Δ Delaware as the dependent variable.  Models 13 and 14 are limited to a subsample of non-California firms.  
Model 14 is estimated on a subsample of firms in which VentureXpert identified the startup’s law firm; model 
16 is limited to firms represented by a “national” law firm; and model 17 is limited to firms represented by a 
“regional” law firm.  The explanatory variables for the reincorporation models are in first-difference format 
(i.e. “Δ”).  All remaining explanatory variables are defined in Table 9.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the 
firm level in models 15 - 17) are reported below each coefficient estimate.  For models 13 and 14, standard 
errors are calculated using the delta-method.  We use a two-sided test for statistical significance (* = 10% and 
** = 1% significance). 
